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A SURVEY OF THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE:




IN 1854 THE SUPREME COURT first announced what
is commonly known now as the "collateral source
rule".' Under this rule, a defendant must bear the full
cost of the injury he caused the plaintiff, regardless of any
compensation the plaintiff receives from an independent
or "collateral" source. 2 Where the rule applies, a defend-
ant cannot introduce evidence at trial that a collateral
source reimbursed the plaintiff for the damages sought by
the plaintiff.3 Thus, under the collateral source rule, the
jury will not receive any evidence that some source paid
the plaintiff for the damages incurred.
A "collateral source" is any source that provides bene-
fits to a plaintiff in connection with the injury for which
the plaintiff sued and is wholly independent of the wrong-
doer.4 The most typical example of a collateral source is
one which provides health insurance benefits, either paid
for by the plaintiff or the plaintiff's employer. Other col-
lateral sources often include Medicare and Medicaid ben-
The Propeller Monticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 152, 15 L. Ed. 68
(1854). The term "collateral source" has been in use since 1871. Harding v.
Townsend, 43 Vt. 536, 538 (1871).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A (2) (1979).
See, e.g., Burk Royalty Co. v. Jacobs, 387 P.2d 638, 640 (Okla. 1963).
Bowman v, Whitelock, 43 Wash. App. 353, 717 P.2d 303, 306 (1986); District
of Columbia v. Jackson, 451 A.2d 867, 871 (D.C. 1982) (A source is collateral
when it is not in any way connected with the tortfeasor).
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efits,5 disability and unemployment benefits,6 wage loss
benefits,7 Social Security benefits,8 and gratuitous benefits
or services. 9 According to the rule, a plaintiff is not only
entitled to the benefits received from a "collateral"
source, but also benefits from the defendant who caused
the injury. While almost every state'0 has retained the
collateral source rule in some form," the rule has many
critics' 2 and a number of courts and legislatures across
the country have partially or completely abrogated the
collateral source rule.13 This comment will serve to clarify
the state of the rule across the country, the attempts to
reform of the rule and the impact of reform on multistate
litigation.
A. Justification for the Collateral Source Rule
Those who support the collateral source rule generally
believe it is a justifiable double recovery for plaintiffs.
The prevailing theory in the states that support the collat-
eral source rule is that the defendant, by virtue of having
caused the plaintiff's injury, should not receive the benefit
of the plaintiff's thrift and foresight in purchasing health,
disability, or property insurance. "4 Many courts charac-
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Moore, 406 So. 2d 347, 351 (Ala. 1981).
6 See, e.g., Witt v. Martin, 672 P.2d 312, 316 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983); Green Forest
Pub. School v. Herrington, 287 Ark. 43, 696 S.W.2d 714, 718 (1985).
7 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-4.5 (2)(d) (Replacement 1987); FLA. STAT.
ANN. ch. 110 2-1205 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
8 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 587 F.2d 1013, 1016 (3rd Cir. 1978); Steckler
v. United States, 549 F.2d 1372, 1379 (10th Cir. 1977).
, See, e.g., Johnson v. Baker, 11 Kan. App. 2d 274, 719 P.2d 752, 756 (1986);
Werner v. Lane, 393 A.2d 1329, 1336 (Me. 1978). Gratuitous services are services
provided without cost to the plaintiff and without any obligation on the part of the
provider.
Any reference to "state" or "states" includes the District of Columbia.
See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
"2 See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
'. See infra notes 52-203 and accompanying text.
14 See, e.g., Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 1, 465 P.2d
61, 66-67, 84 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1970); Kickham v. Carter, 335 S.W.2d 83, 90 (Mo.
1960); My Sister's Place v. City of Burlington, 139 Vt. 602, 433 A.2d 275, 281
(1981). Generally, it does not matter whether the plaintiff paid for the premiums
for the insurance herself, as long as the plaintiff is the beneficiary of the policy.
See, e.g.,Joiner v. Fort, 226 S.C. 249, 84 S.E.2d 719, 722 (1954).
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terize the benefit the defendant would receive, if evidence
of collateral sources were admissible, as a windfall to the
defendant.' 5 Supporters of the rule emphasize that a de-
fendant should be forced to bear full responsibility for his
wrongdoing and that the windfall should go to the injured
party.' 6 As one court states it, the purpose of the collat-
eral source rule is "to deter negligent conduct by placing
the full cost of the wrongful conduct on the tortfeasor."'' 7
Many courts justify the imposition of the collateral
source rule because they believe that such evidence con-
fuses juries. In addressing this issue, the Supreme Court
held that the likelihood of misuse by, and prejudicial im-
pact on, the jury of evidence of collateral sources out-
weighs the value of admitting such evidence. Courts
express a common concern that admitting evidence of
collateral sources at trial unnecessarily prolongs the trial' 9
and confuses the jury.20 Even when defendants attempt
to introduce evidence of collateral sources for purposes
other than to show that a collateral source reimbursed the
plaintiff,21 most courts hold that jurors would be confused
even as to the limited purpose of the evidence.22 The
15 See, e.g.,Jackson, 451 A.2d at 870; Quinones v. Passiac Boys Club, 183 N.J.
Super. 531, 444 A.2d 630, 631 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 199 N.J. Super., 488
A.2d 1036 (1985).
16 See, e.g., Burks v. Webb, 199 Va. 296, 99 S.E.2d 629, 636 (1957); Anastasia v.
Barnes, 127 Misc. 2d 971, 487 N.Y.S.2d 628, 630 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
17 American Standard Ins. Co. v. Cleveland, 124 Wis. 2d 258, 369 N.W.2d 168,
172 (1985).
i, Eichel v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 375 U.S. 253, 255 (1963) (in an action brought
under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, the Court refused to allow the defend-
ant to bring in evidence of collateral sources for the purpose of showing that the
plaintiff had no incentive to return to work). The Supreme Court did not expand
on its conclusion that the potential misuse by the jury outweighs the value of such
evidence.
is, See, e.g., Reinan v. Pacific Motor Trucking Co., 270 Or. 208, 527 P.2d 256,
259 (1974).
20 See, e.g., Corsetti v. Stone Co., 396 Mass. 1, 483 N.E. 2d 793, 802 (1985).
2 The defendant may try to show, for example, that the plaintiff has not re-
turned to work, not because he is still injured, but because the collateral benefits
he is receiving are higher than his salary. The courts typically refer to this as a
,'malingering" defense. See, e.g., McMiddleton v. Otis Elevator Co., 139 Mich.
App. 418, 362 N.W.2d 812, 817 (1984).
' See, e.g., the discussion of the general rule in Corsetti, 396 Mass. at 1, 483
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courts, therefore, generally refuse to allow the evidence in
at all. 23 Judges fear ajury will improperly reduce an award
by the amount of the collateral benefits received in order
to prevent the plaintiff from receiving what the jury per-
ceives as a double recovery.24
A final justification for continued use of the collateral
source rule centers on contingent fee arrangements be-
tween a personal injury plaintiff and her attorney. The
theory is that once a plaintiff pays her attorneys' fees she
is left under compensated.2 5 Once a plaintiff pays a large
portion of her award to her attorney, she is left with less
than the full award the jury decided she deserved. 26 As-
suming the jury does not realize that part of the plaintiff's
award will go to the plaintiff's attorney,27 the collateral
source rule allows the plaintiff to pay her attorney and still
recover enough to adequately compensate her for her in-
juries.28 Under this logic, the plaintiff is not receiving a
double recovery.29 This theory, of course, is premised on
the belief that the defendant should pay for the plaintiff's
attorneys' fees if the plaintiff is successful in her suit
against the defendant. If there was no collateral source
rule, should the defendant, if she loses, have to pay the
plaintiff's attorneys' fees? If the answer is yes, then the
theory that no double recovery exists is valid.
B. Criticism of the Collateral Source Rule
Even before the 1980's era of tort reform legislation
N.E.2d at 802. Some courts however allow the defendant to introduce evidence
of collateral benefits for purposes other than to reduce the plaintiff's recovery.
See infra notes 195-201 and accompanying text.
21 Corsetti, 396 Mass. at 1, 483 N.E.2d at 802.
24 Id. As the court stated, "jurors might be led by the irrelevancy to consider
plaintiffs' claims unimportant or trivial or to refuse plaintiffs' verdicts or reduce
them, believing that otherwise there would be unjust double recovery." Id.




2' Id.; see also McDowell, The Collateral Source Rule - The American Medical Associa-
tion and Tort Reform, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 205, 213 (1985).
and the concern over the insurance crisis, 30 scholars lev-
eled much criticism at the collateral source rule .3  As will
be discussed, criticism of the rule has continued, resulting
in numerous changes in the rule across the United
States.3 1 Much of the criticism focuses on the double re-
covery aspect of the rule: that the plaintiff receives com-
pensation for a loss she did not suffer.33 The concern is
not so much for the defendant, or the insurance company
that provides the collateral source, but for the overall ef-
fect on the legal system and insurance premiums. 4 For
example, in a case where the only damages the plaintiff
suffered are those in which a collateral source reimbursed
the plaintiff,3 5 the collateral source rule encourages a
plaintiff to litigate rather than to accept what he already
received as payment.3 6 With such litigation comes the at-
tendant legal costs, the use of judicial resources, and the
time of witnesses, litigants, and jurors. 7
One concern over the continued use of this rule centers
on the number of public funds available to injured plain-
tiffs to which the plaintiff did not specifically contribute.3 8
Unlike benefits from sources for which the plaintiff paid a
premium, benefits from such public sources are not attrib-
30 See infra notes 204-222 and accompanying text.
Helfend, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 175-76, 465 P.2d at 63-64 (the court cites a number
of articles written in the late 1950's and early 1960's criticizing the rule); see also
McDowell, supra note 29, at 205.
.12 See infra notes 52-203 and accompanying text.
"- See McDowell, supra note 29, at 213.
54 Id. For a discussion of the insurance crisis and the effects on tort reform, see
Mayesh & Reid, Current State of Tort Reform Ignited by Insurance Crisis, 195 N.Y.L.J.,
May 20, 1986, at 1, col. 3-4; Report of the Tort Policy Working Group on the
Causes, Extent and Policy Implications of the Current Crisis in Insurance Availa-
bility and Affordability (February, 1986) (Publication by the committee appointed
by the United States Attorney General. Available from Ohio State University Law
Library) [hereinafter Attorney General's Report]; Insuring our Future; Report of the
Governor's Advisory Commission on Liability Insurance (April, 1986) (Publica-
tion by the committee appointed by New York Governor Mario Cuomo. Available
from the Arnold & Porter Library in New York) [hereinafter Governor's Report].
. This is not likely to occur when the plaintiff suffers only property damage.
'" McDowell, supra note 29, at 211.
.4 Id.
s. Such benefits would include unemployment benefits and certain state and
federal disability programs.
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utable to a plaintiff's thrift or foresight.3 Some courts
continue, however, to apply the collateral source rule to
these benefits. 4' Allowing plaintiffs to recover for dam-
ages not suffered is considered the judiciary's way of im-
posing punitive damages in cases where punitive damages
are not otherwise available.41 Under such theory, though,
the collateral source rule treats negligent defendants on
the same level with defendants who have acted intention-
ally and those who are strictly liable for their conduct.4 2
This theory of punishing defendants, as well as the deter-
rence theory,43 is premised on the ability of the collateral
source rule to deter negligent conduct. Negligent conduct,
by definition, occurs without thought on the part of the
wrongdoer. One should question whether imposing the
collateral source rule effectively deters such conduct.44
When the collateral source rule was adopted in the late
19th century, few persons carried any type of insurance.4 5
At that time, courts undoubtedly were not concerned that
juries would speculate as to other benefits the plaintiff re-
ceived in compensation for her injury. In comparison, the
majority of jurors today know that most people are cov-
ered by some form of insurance.46 Critics raise a concern
that the collateral source rule leads a jury to speculate as
39 Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Damages, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 56, 58
(1983).
40 See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
41 Comment, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The Collateral Source Rule, 77 HARV.
L. REV. 741, 748-49 (1964). At least one court admitted that its use of the collat-
eral source rule is indeed punitive. Hubbard Broadcasting v. Loescher, 291
N.W.2d 216, 222 (Minn. Ct. App. 1980) ("Because its purpose is punitive, [the collat-
eral source] doctrine has generally been applied only to tort cases." (emphasis
supplied)).
42 Comment, supra note 41, at 748-49.
4.1 See American Standard Ins. Co., 124 Wis.2d at 258, 369 N.W. 2d at 172. The
courts espousing the deterrence theory support the collateral source rule as a de-
terrent to negligent conduct. See id.
4 This is particularly true when the average person is unaware that such a rule
exists. If a person is unaware that a penalty exists, can the penalty actually deter
conduct?
4 5 McDowell, supra note 29, at 215.
41 Id.
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to whether a plaintiff has insurance to cover his injury.4 7
An uninsured plaintiff, therefore, is prejudiced if the jury
believes she has insurance.48 When a court allows the jury
to receive evidence of insurance benefits, the jury will
then have reliable evidence on which to base its award,
rather than speculating on the plaintiff's possible insur-
ance coverage.49
The argument that the collateral source rule exists to
enable the plaintiff to pay his attorney's fees and still be
adequately compensated serves to defeat what is known as
the "American Rule." Under this rule, the losing party,
absent a statute to the contrary, is not obligated to pay the
successful litigant's attorney's fees. 50 Under the collateral
source rule, therefore, certain plaintiffs are able to re-
cover twice for their injury, effectively circumventing the
American Rule and obtaining a recovery for their attor-
ney's fees.
The collateral source rule may in actuality be used as a
vehicle for increasing an award for a plaintiff who is inade-
quately compensated. This justification, however, fails to
account for those plaintiffs who may suffer from severe
trauma or disfigurement, but who did not incur substan-
tial medical expenses. Because the plaintiff recovers twice
for any damages already reimbursed by a collateral
source, some plaintiffs are rewarded for accumulating
massive medical bills. The collateral source rule, thus,
discriminates among the plaintiffs who will benefit by the
advantages of the rule. Finally, the concern is to ensure
adequate compensation for all injured plaintiffs. The
courts, therefore, should apply the rule uniformly, a situa-
tion not existing among the jurisdictions today.5
Criticism of this rule has resulted in changes across the
47 Id. For example, jurors may, consciously or unconsciously, assume that a
plaintiff is covered by medical insurance and react accordingly when determining
the amount the jury should award the plaintiff for damages.
49 Id.
41 Id.
r- See Colombrito v. Kelly, 764 F.2d 122, 134 (2d Cir. 1985).
51 See infra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
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country. Many states have either completely abrogated
the rule, restricted it to certain types of lawsuits, or re-
stricted the rule to only certain types of collateral
sources.- 2 As discussed in the following sections the re-
sult is an inconsistent application of the rule among the
states. The dual underlying premise of the rule, to ensure
plaintiffs adequate compensation and to force defendants
to assume the full costs of any wrongdoing, disappear
when only certain plaintiffs benefit from the rule. The
same defendant being sued in various states over identical
conduct will likely pay some plaintiffs for damages not
suffered while paying other plaintiffs only for their actual
losses. In any multistate litigation, the inequity in the ap-
plication of the collateral source rule will likely result in a
scenario where similarly situated plaintiffs receive dramat-
ically different awards. For example, several plaintiffs may
bring suit in several states for one tortious act. Under the
disparate application of the collateral source rule existing
today, some plaintiffs could be subject to varying reduc-
tions in an award while others will not realize any de-
crease. A survey of the present state of the collateral
source rule will demonstrate the slow erosion and lack of
uniformity in the application of the rule among the states.
II. THE STATE OF THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
Currently forty-five states and the District of Columbia
allow claimants to recover some or all benefits already re-
ceived or to be received from collateral sources.53 This
-52 See irofra notes 52-203.
.1 Gribble v. Cox, 349 So. 2d 1141, 1142 (Ala. 1977); Michael v. Cole, 122 Ariz.
450, 595 P.2d 995, 997 (1979); Green Forest Pub. School, 287 Ark. at 43, 696 S.W.2d
at 718; Helfend, 2 Cal. 3d at 1, 465 P.2d at 63, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 175; Powell v.
Brady, 30 Colo. App. 406, 496 P.2d 328, 332-33 (1972); Yarrington v. Thorn-
burg, 58 Del. 152, 205 A.2d 1,2 (1964);Jackson, 451 A.2d at 870 (District of Co-
lumbia); McGlohon v. Ogden, 251 Ga. 625, 308 S.E.2d 541, 542 (1983);
Boudreau v. General Elec. Co., 2 Haw. App. 10, 625 P.2d 384, 389 (1981) (by
implication); Swift & Co. v. Gutierez, 277 P.2d 559, 561 (Idaho 1954); Ill. Code of
Civ. Proc. Ch. 110, 2-1205.1 (1987); Stewart v. Madison, 278 N.W.2d 284, 293
(Iowa 1979);Johnson, 11 Kan. App. 2d at 274, 719 P.2d at 756; Our Lady of Mercy
Hosp. v. McIntosh, 461 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Ky. 1970); Savoie v. McCall's Boat
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right of recovery, though, is no longer purely pursuant to
the common law collateral source rule because many state
legislatures have acted to reduce the availability of bene-
fits under the rule. In fact, of the forty-five states that ap-
ply the rule, only seventeen states and the District of
Columbia apply the collateral source rule in tort actions
without any exception. 4 The collateral source rule is a
Rentals, Inc., 491 So. 2d 94, 104 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Werner, 393 A.2d at 1336
(Me.); Leizear v. Butler, 226 Md. 171, 172 A.2d 518, 520 (1961); Corsetti, 396
Mass. at 1, 483 N.E.2d at 802-804; McMiddleton v. Otis Elevator Co., 139 Mich.
App. 418, 362 N.W.2d 812, 817 (1984); Star Chevrolet Co. v. Green, 473 So. 2d
157, 162 (Miss. 1985); Kickham, 335 S.W.2d at 90 (Mo.) (Missouri's legislature
recently affirmed the validity of the collateral source rule by codifying the com-
mon law rule. 1987 Mo. Legis. Serv. Vol. 1, H.B. 700, § 38 (Vernon). The de-
fendant may only introduce evidence that he had made payments to the plaintiff,
but upon doing so he loses any rights to a credit against the judgment. Id.);
Huenink v. Collins, 181 Neb. 195, 147 N.W.2d 508, 509 (1966); Merchants Mut.
Ins. Group v. Orthopedic Professional Ass'n., 235 N.H. 648, 480 A.2d 840, 844
(1984); Long v. Landy, 35 NJ. 44, 171 A.2d 1, 7 (1961); Hansen v. Skate Ranch,
Inc., 97 N.M. 486, 641 P.2d 517, 523 (1982); Scallon v. Hooper, 58 N.C. App.
551, 293 S.E.2d 843, 844 (1982); Keller v. Gama, 378 N.W.2d 867, 868 (N.D.
1985); Burk Royalty Co. v. Jacobs, 387 P.2d 638, 640 (Okla. 1963); Reinan, 270
Or. at 208, 527 P.2d at 259; Beechwoods Flying Serv., Inc. v. Al Hamilton Con-
tracting Corp., 504 Pa. 618, 476 A.2d 350 (1971); Soucy v. Martin, 121 R.I. 651,
402 A.2d 1167, 1170 (1979);Joiner, 226 S.C. at 249, 84 S.E.2d at 722; Degen v.
Bayman, 90 S.D. 400, 241 N.W,2d 703, 708 (1976); Donnell v. Donnell, 220
Tenn. 169,415 S.W.2d 127, 135 (1967); Russell v. Dunn Equip., Inc., 712 S.W.2d
542, 547 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986); DuBois v. Nye, 584 P.2d 823, 825 (Utah 1978); My
Sister's Place, 139 Vt. at 602, 433 A.2d at 281; Burks, 199 Va. at 296, 99 S.E.2d at
636; Goodell v. ITT - Federal Support Serv., Inc., 89 Wash. 2d 488, 573 P.2d
1292, 1294 (1978); Orr v. Crowder, 315 S.E.2d 593, 609-10 (W. Va. 1983), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 981 (1984); Merz v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 53 Wis. 2d 47, 191
N.W.2d 876, 879 (1971); Wheatland Irrigation Dist. v. McGuire, 562 P.2d 287,
302 (Wyo. 1977). COLO. REv. STATE. § 13-21-111.6 (Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-4-36-2 (Burns 1986); MICH. COMP. LAws § 600.6303 (West 1987); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-1-307, 308 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.02-35 (1984). No Nevada
court has specifically held that the collateral source rule exists in that state. How-
ever, the Supreme Court of Nevada recently held the following: "In the context of
automobile insurance, we have consistently upheld the fundamental principle that
an insured is entitled to receive the insurance benefits for which he has paid a
premium." Maxwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 728 P.2d 812, 815 (Nev. 1986). In strik-
ing down clauses in insurance contracts which permitted rights of subrogation for
medical payments, the court stated that "[p]recluding the subrogation of the in-
surer does not result in a double recovery for the insured because the insured is
merely receiving the benefits for which he has already paid." Id. at 815. This
Comment does not address the availability of the collateral source rule with re-
gard to workers' compensation statutes.
fm Arkansas, District of Columbia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Car-
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common law rule that a legislature can change by stat-
ute,55 and legislatures have so changed the rule in over
half of the states. Six state legislatures have completely
abrogated the rule.56 Three states only apply the rule to
collateral sources funded directly or constructively by the
plaintiff or the plaintiff's family.57  At least thirty-one
states have eliminated the collateral source rule in at least
one of the following types of actions: product liability
cases,58 actions against a public employer,5 9 actions
against the government, 60 medical malpractice actions,6 '
and actions under certain "no-fault" statutes.62 States
that have abolished the collateral source rule are inconsis-
tent in the types of collateral sources defendants may in-
troduce at trial. State legislatures, further, generally
disagree as to whether the jury or the court will hear the
collateral source evidence. Legislatures that have abol-
ished the rule in some form, however, do agree that where
a right of subrogation exists as to collateral benefits re-
ceived, the collateral source rule will apply because there
is no threat of double recovery.65
olina, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Most courts do
not apply the collateral source rule in contract actions. See, e.g., Dennison v. Head
Constr. Co., 54 Md. App. 310, 458 A.2d 868, 874 (1983).
55 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 902A comment d (1979).
5; ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.070 (Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-225a (1987);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76 (West Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP. LAws § 600.6303
(1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.36 (Supp. 1987); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 4545(c)
(McKinney Supp. 1987).
-7 CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.6; IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-36-2 (Burns 1986);
My Sister's Place, 139 Vt. at 602, 433 A.2d at 281; see infra notes 109-130 and ac-
companying text.
11 See infra notes 184-186 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 187-188 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 189-190 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 131-171 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 172-183 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Heifetz v. Johnson, 61 Wis. 2d 111, 211 N.W.2d 834, 841 (1973).
The plaintiff will not receive compensation twice because she must pay the collat-
eral source from her award. Id. The plaintiff must be allowed to recover the full
amount of damages free from the subrogation claim of the insurer. Id.; see also
statues cited at notes 63-125.
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A. Legislative Revisions of the Common Law Collateral Source
Rule as Applied to All Tort Actions
Eleven states took the common law collateral source
rule and replaced it with a statutory scheme that, wholly
or partially, eliminates the rule itself or eliminates the
benefits of the rule.64 This legislation represents a legisla-
tive response to public reaction to tort reform efforts. In
one state, Vermont, the Supreme Court limited the appli-
cation of the rule without legislative intervention.65 The
following discussion summarizes the types of legislation
passed in each state and the particulars of that legislation.
In 1986, the Alaska legislature amended its Code of
Civil Procedure by adding a new chapter entitled "Limita-
tions on Civil Liability."'6 6 Among the many limitations
the legislature placed on a claimant's recovery, it effec-
tively abolished the collateral source rule.67 Evidence that
the claimant received compensation from collateral
sources for the same injury is introduced after the fact-
finder renders an award and after the court awards costs
and attorneys' fees. 68  The court deducts the amount of
the collateral benefits received by the claimant from the
award. 69 The claimant may, however, in order to mitigate
the reduction, introduce evidence that his attorneys' fees
actually exceed the amount awarded by the court. 70 The
- Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minne-
sota, New York, Ohio, and Vermont.
' See My Sister's Place, 139 Vt. at 602, 433 A.2d at 281.
m, ALAsKA STAT. §§ 09.17. 011-09.17.900 (Supp. 1987).
67 ALAsKA STAT. § 09.17.070 (Supp. 1986). The statute reads as follows:
Collateral benefits. (a) After the facts finder has rendered an award
to a claimant, and after the court has awarded costs and attorneys
fees, a defendant may introduce evidence of amounts received or to
be received by the claimant as compensation for the same injury
from collateral sources that do not have a right of subrogation by
law or contract.
Id.
Id6 Id. § 09.17.070(a). The obvious result of this is that the attorney takes a per-
centage of the larger award which is then paid by the plaintiff from the smaller
award.
w. Id. § 09.17.070(c).
71 Id. § 09.17.170(b).
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claimant may also introduce evidence of the amount she
paid or contributed to secure insurance benefits. 7 This
amount will affect the amount deducted by the court from
the award.72 The defendant may not introduce evidence
of benefits available under federal law that a court cannot
reduce or offset, a deceased's life insurance policy, or gra-
tuitous benefits provided to the claimant. 73
In recent revisions of their statutes governing civil ac-
tions, Connecticut eliminated the effects of the common
law collateral source rule.7 4 Where a claimant seeks re-
covery for personal injury or wrongful death in a tort or
contract action, that claimant cannot recover for amounts
paid by collateral sources. 75 However, the jury never con-
siders evidence of the claimant's receipt of collateral
sources because the court will reduce the claimant's
award.76 Further, the successful claimant is entitled to an
offset of the reduction equal to the amounts paid to se-
cure those collateral sources.77 The history of the statute
indicates that it began as a limitation on medical malprac-
tice recoveries and was later changed to include all civil
actions seeking compensation for personal injury or
wrongful death.78
Colorado only recently joined the tort reform move-
ment by partially abrogating the effects of the collateral
source rule. 79 In that state, the court will reduce a claim-
ant's recovery by the amount for which he "has been or
will be wholly or partially indemnified or compensated."80
The claimant's recovery is not reduced by benefits paid as
a result of a contract entered into and paid for by or on
7 Id. § 09.17.070(b)(2).
72 Id. § 09.17.070(c).
7.4 Id. § 09.17.070(d).
74 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-225a (1987).
7.5 Id. "Collateral sources" are separately defined under § 52-225b.
76 Id.
77 Id.
7M Id. (see Comment, § 52-225a).
79 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.6 (Supp. 1986).
N Id. The statute applies solely to tort actions "resulting in death or injury to
person or property." Id.
behalf of the claimant. 8' The statute has the effect, there-
fore, of reducing a successful plaintiff's recovery by the
amount of benefits received for which the plaintiff did not
contract.
Using a different approach, Illinois amended its Code
of Civil Procedure to accomplish a partial abrogation of
the collateral source rule.82 In all negligence and strict
product liability actions, the court will reduce a successful
plaintiff's recovery by the amount of collateral sources re-
ceived which exceed $25,000.3 The defendant, though,
must apply to the court within thirty days of the judgment
to have the judgment reduced.8 4 The reduction in the
judgment cannot exceed more than fifty percent of the to-
tal award.8 5 Finally, the court will increase the judgment
by the amount of premiums or direct costs the plaintiff
paid two years before the injury and the amount he will
pay in the future.86
A claimant in Michigan seeking recovery for economic
losses in a personal injury action will not recover any
amounts paid or payable by collateral sources.8 7 The court
will determine the amount of a plaintiff's expenses cov-
ered by a collateral source, but the court will not reduce
the judgment by more than the amount of the award for
economic loss.8 8 The plaintiff receives credit for premi-
ums paid by or for the benefit of the plaintiff.8 9 A "collat-
eral source" under Michigan's law does not include life
insurance benefits or any benefit paid by a person entitled
to a lien against the plaintiff's recovery.9 0 Finally, a collat-
eral source is not considered payable or recoverable un-
81 Id.
' ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 2-1205.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987).





87 MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.6303(1) (West 1987).
"' Id. § 600.6303(1).
, Id. § 600.6303(2).
Id. § 600.6303(4).
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less that source has a previously existing contractual or
statutory obligation to pay the benefits. 91
In 1986, Minnesota followed the tort reform crusade by
also enacting a statute abolishing the effects of the com-
mon law collateral source rule.92 As with the other states,
Minnesota law now permits a court to reduce a plaintiff's
award by the amount of collateral benefits paid or other-
wise available to the plaintiff.93 The realization is offset by
the amounts paid, contributed, or forfeited in the two
years preceding the award to secure the collateral bene-
fits. 94 If the successful plaintiff is liable to her attorney for
a percentage based upon the adjusted award, 95 the statute
specifically provides that the jury will not know that collat-
eral sources exist or that future benefits are available to
the plaintiff.9 6 The legislation provides a broad definition
of collateral sources, including worker's compensation
benefits and wage loss benefits.97 As with other statutes,
life insurance benefits are not included.98 Unlike other
statutes, this legislation applies to contract and tort
actions .99
In 1986, the Florida legislature also effectively abol-
ished the collateral source rule in all tort actions by enact-
ing the Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986.100 Under
this statute, after the trier of fact renders its award, the
court will deduct all nonsubrogated benefits received by
the plaintiff, or benefits "available" to him, from all collat-
1), Id. § 600.6303(5). Whether such an obligation exists is determined by the
court. Id.
92 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.36 (West Supp. 1987).
9. Id. § 548.36 (Subd. 2(1) & Subd. 3(a)) (except by collateral sources to which
a right of subrogation exists. Id.).
4 Id. § 548.36 (Subd. 2(2) & Subd.3(a)).
, Id. § 548.36 (Subd. 4). "Any subrogated provider of a collateral source not
separately represented by counsel shall pay the same percentage of attorneys fees
as paid by the plaintiff and shall pay its proportionate share of the costs." Id.
w, Id. § 548.36 (Subd.5).
1,7 Id. § 548.36 (Subd.l).
""Id
I ld. § 548.36 (Subd. 2).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76 (West Supp. 1987).
eral sources.'' The reduction is offset by any amount the
plaintiff or his family paid, contributed, or forfeited to se-
cure the benefits from the collateral sources.10 2 Attor-
neys' fees which are calculated on a percentage of the
plaintiff's award are determined on the basis of the net
award to the plaintiff. 10 3 While this statute does not con-
sider Medicaid benefits as a collateral source, it does con-
sider other federal, state or local programs as collateral
sources. 104
The New York legislature chose to prevent double re-
coveries for plaintiffs by statutorily providing that in all
actions for personal injury, injury to property or wrongful
death, the plaintiff cannot recover for benefits received or
due.10 5 In all such actions the court will reduce the plain-
tiff's award by the amount of past or future collateral ben-
efits the plaintiff received or will receive. 10 6 The court,
though, will mitigate the reduction of the plaintiff's award
by the amount the plaintiff paid to receive collateral bene-
fits. 10 7 The court will not deduct those collateral sources
entitled by law to liens against any recovery. 0 8
Under the Indiana Rules of Civil Procedure the collat-
eral source rule is partially abrogated. 0 9 The defendant
is permitted under this rule to introduce evidence to the
fact-finder" ° of proof of collateral source payments other
than:
(a) Payments of life insurance or other death benefits; (b)
Insurance benefits for which the plaintiff or members of
the plaintiffs' family have paid for directly; or (c) Payments
to, Id. § 768.76(1).
102 Id.
o., Id. § 768.76(3).
1- Id. § 768.76(2)(b).
,o. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4545 (McKinney 1987).
,o6 ld.
107 Id. The mitigation is to the extent of premiums paid by the plaintiff for the
two-year period immediately preceding the injury and to the extent of the future
costs of maintaining such benefits. Id.
,I" Id.
loo IND. CODE ANN. tit. 34-4, ch. 36, § 2 (Bums 1986).
... Id. tit. 34-4-36-3.
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made by the state of Indiana or the United States, or any
agency, instrumentality, or subdivision thereof, that have
been made before trial to a plaintiff as compensation for
the loss or injury for which the action is brought."'
The plaintiff can introduce evidence of the amount of
benefits he received which must be repaid and the cost to
the plaintiff, or his family, of securing the collateral bene-
fits."12 If the court does not consider benefits received
from an insurance policy paid for by an employer as bene-
fits paid for "directly" by the plaintiff under category (b),
then the receipt of such benefits would be admissible at
trial. The statute does not attempt to list specifically what
collateral sources the jury should deduct.
The Montana legislature also decided that plaintiffs'
awards needed to be reduced and enacted legislation to
accomplish that result. The partial elimination of the im-
pact of the collateral source rule was accomplished by leg-
islation generally following other states' reforms, but with
its own variation.' 1 3 The definition of a collateral source
is very broad and includes almost "any source" available
to a plaintiff."14 The statute, however, does not apply un-
less the plaintiff's recovery exceeds $50,000 and the plain-
tiff is "fully compensated" for his injury." t 5 The plaintiff
is entitled to credit for amounts paid on the five years
prior to the injury and from the injury to the date ofjudg-
ment."16 The plaintiff is credited with the present value
amounts that the plaintiff must pay in order to continue
receiving any collateral benefits." t7 As with most other
states, the jury never learns about the plaintiff's receipt of
11, Id. tit. 34-4-36-3(1).
112 Id. tit. 34-4-36-3(2),(3).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-307, 308 (1987).
Id. § 27-1-307. Section 27-1-307 specifically includes "any other source"
within its definition, but expressly excludes life insurance benefits, gratuitous ben-
efits, and assets of the plaintiff or plaintiff's immediate family which he is obli-
gated to repay. Those collateral sources which have a right of subrogation are not
considered in reducing plaintiff's award. Id. § 17-1-308(1), (3).
Id. § 27-1-308(1).
Id. § 27-1-308(2)(a),(b).
'17 Id. § 27-1-308(2)(c).
collateral benefits.' 18
Finally, in 1987 Ohio became the most recent state to
enact major tort reform legislation.' 19 In all tort ac-
tions, 120 as with the other states' reforms, the jury will not
hear the evidence of the availability of collateral
sources.1 2 ' The court will reduce plaintiff's compensatory
damage award by the amount of collateral benefits re-
ceived. 122 The court will deduct the plaintiff's award by
the amount of future benefits the plaintiff will receive, but
only by the amount the plaintiff will receive within sixty
months after entry of judgment.' 23 The plaintiff gets
credit for his costs in obtaining the benefits although he is
only credited for costs incurred within the three years pre-
ceding the plaintiff's injury. ' 24 The definition of collateral
benefits is very broad under this statute and includes pub-
lic as well as private collateral sources.125
In My Sister's Place v. Burlington, Vermont implicitly re-
stricted the application of the collateral source rule in a
manner similar to the Indiana rule. 126 While Vermont
supports the application of the collateral source rule, the
Supreme Court of that state appears to have limited its
application. 127 According to the court, the rule only ap-
plies to compensation from collateral sources where the
plaintiff has actually or constructively paid for the benefits
received or where the collateral source would be recom-
pensed from the plaintiff's award. 128  Although not ex-
,, Id. § 27-1-308(3).
Amended Substitute H.B. 1, 117th Gen. Assembly, 1987, Ohio (enacted but
not officially published; subsequent references will refer to this bill by section
numbers as they will appear when officially published).
12o The legislature defines tort action as a "cure action for damages for injury,
death, or loss to person or property" and includes product liability claims. Id.
§ 2317.45(A)(1)(c).
21 Id. § 2317.45(B)(3).
122 Id. § 2317.45(B)(2)(c)(i).
1'2 Id. § 2317.45(B)(2)(a)(i).
124 Id. § 2317.45(B)(2)(b).
' Id. § 2317.45(A)(l)(a).
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pressly stated, by including those sources that are
"constructively" paid for by the plaintiff, the court may
have included those collateral sources paid for by others
for the plaintiffs' benefit.' 29 The rule would also apply in
cases where the collateral source is entitled to reimburse-
ment or has a right of subrogation. 30
B. Medical Malpractice Actions
The area in which the state legislatures have most fre-
quently acted to abolish'the collateral source rule is with
regard to malpractice litigation. At least sixteen state leg-
islatures have enacted various measures aimed at reduc-
ing the amount of the award a jury may give a plaintiff in
such actions.' 3 ' Although the legislatures of each state
may agree that they should change the collateral source
rule, each state approaches the application of the rule dif-
ferently. Some legislatures were willing to go all the way
in eliminating the collateral source rule in medical mal-
practice actions while others have only abolished the rule
as to certain collateral sources. The inconsistencies re-
flect the diverging views on the validity of the collateral
source rule. They express the differing concerns involv-
ing the effect on a jury given information that collateral
121 For example, insurance plans paid for by an employer.
My Sister's Place, 139 Vt. at 602, 433 A.2d at 827.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.548 (1983); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-565 (Supp.
1986); CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.1 (West Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18,
§ 6862 (Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.50 (West 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
110, 2-1205 (Smith-Hurd 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.136 (West Supp. 1986);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3403 (1986); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60G (Law Co-op.
1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2819 (1984); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R § 4545(a) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-19-34.i (Supp. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 21-3-12 (Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-119 (1980); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-14-4.5 (Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.080 (Supp.
1987). Alaska, Florida and New York are included in this list because, when the
legislatures of both states enacted their tort reform statutes abolishing the collat-
eral source rule, they continued to maintain separate medical malpractice statutes.
Idaho repealed its medical malpractice statute in 1979. IDAHO CODE § 39-4210
(repealed 1979). See supra notes 157-163 and 164-171 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the New Hampshire and Ohio medical malpractice statutes. This
comment does not address other medical malpractice statutes which have no ef-
fect on the common law collateral source rule.
benefits exist. Further, the various statutes react differ-
ently to the issue of whether or not the plaintiff should
receive the benefit of an insurance policy actually or con-
structively paid by him.
Even those sixteen states which have enacted measures
to reduce generally disagree on the definition of a collat-
eral source, which collateral benefits the legislatures
should include in reducing the plaintiffs award, and who
should receive the evidence. Four states only allow the
defendant to introduce evidence regarding benefits from
collateral sources not funded by the plaintiff or the plain-
tiff's immediate family.' 3 2 Only seven states even attempt
to specifically describe what the term "collateral source"
includes. 13 3  For example, in Washington a collateral
source is "any source except the assets of the [plaintiff],
his representative, or his immediate family, or insurance
purchased with such assets."'' 34  In Utah, the statute en-
compasses "all collateral sources."' 1 5  In Nebraska, the
phrase "nonrefundable medical reimbursement insurance
benefits" is used in place of collateral sources. 136 Ten
states either specifically exclude life insurance benefits
from the definition of a collateral source or exclude such
1 2 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6862 (Supp. 1986) ("This section shall not be ap-
plicable to the insurance or private collateral sources of compensation."); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-3-12 (Benefits received from insurance purchased pri-
vately by the plaintiff, or an immediate family member, or paid for by state or
federal government programs not entitled to subrogation are not admissible to
reduce the plaintiff's award.); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 29-26-119 (1980) (The damage
award includes only actual economic losses not replaced or indemnified by any
source except plaintiff's own assets or insurance purchased privately and individu-
ally); see also McDaniel v. General Care Corp., 627 S.W.2d 129, 132-33 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.080 (Supp. 1987) (any party may intro-
duce evidence that the plaintiff was compensated for the injury complained of
from any source, except where he was compensated from his own assets, or those of
his representative or immediate family, or from insurance purchased with such
assets. Insurance provided through an employer' is considered insurance
purchased with an asset of the employee).
--" Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York and Rhode
Island.
.. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.080 (Supp. 1987) (emphasis supplied).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-4.5 (1987).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2819 (1984).
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benefits by the terms of the statute. 37  A few states have
added variations on the general scheme to reduce awards
by the amount of collateral sources. Only Utah and
Washington refuse to reduce a plaintiff's award by the
amount of future benefits available to the plaintiff.' 38
There is one exception in Utah to this prohibition; the de-
fendant can introduce the availability of benefits from
government programs and the court or jury may consider
such in determining the amount of damages awarded for
future expenses. 3 Massachusetts law allows the defend-
ant to pay the plaintiff's insurance premiums in order to
keep an insurance policy in force during the pendency of
the action.1 40 In Florida, the plaintiff's attorney can only
base his contingent fee on the plaintiff's net award.' 41
The courts in Alaska may consider the value of the claim-
ant's rights to coverage which the plaintiff exhausted or
depleted by the payment benefits. 42
Many of the statutes permit the plaintiff to introduce ev-
idence as to any credits she is due before the court or jury
deducts from her award. Of the twelve states which allow
the court or jury to consider evidence of collateral sources
funded by the plaintiff in reducing the plaintiff's award,
nine permit the plaintiff to introduce evidence of premi-
ums paid by the plaintiff, or by his immediate family, to
secure the collateral benefits. 43 When such evidence is
1:,7 Alaska, California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, New York,
Rhode Island and Utah.
'11 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-4.5 (1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.080
(Supp. 1987) (the Washington statute states that "evidence ... that the patient
has already been compensated" is admissable.)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-4.5(4) (1987).
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60G(d) (Supp. 1987).
14 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.50(3) (West 1986).
'- ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.548(b) (1983). The court may add back into the claim-
ant's award a reasonable estimate of the probable value of those benefits. It may
hold for possible periodic payment the amount of the award that the court would
otherwise deduct to see if an impairment of the claimant's rights actually takes
place. Id.
-. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-565(A) (Supp. 1986); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3333.1(a) (West 1970 & Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.50(1) (West 1986);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 2-1205(4) (Smith-Hurd 1987); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
231, § 60G(d) (Supp. 1987); NEB. REV. STATE. § 44-2910(1) (1984); N.Y. Civ. L. &
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admissable, the court or jury increases the award by that
amount. 144  Nine states provide that, under certain cir-
cumstances, a plaintiff's award will not be reduced if the
collateral source has a right of subrogation or recoup-
ment.145 Usually, the reduction is allowed only if the right
of subrogation is provided by law.' 46 Under Alaska and
Massachusetts law, for example, the court will not reduce
the plaintiff's award by the amount of collateral benefits
received only if those collateral sources have a right of
subrogation under federal law. 14 7 Otherwise, the collat-
eral source is precluded from proceeding against the
plaintiff or the defendant.1 48 Two states' laws, California
and Rhode Island, insist that a provider of a collateral
source cannot seek reimbursement against the plaintiff,
nor is that provider subrogated to the rights of the
plaintiff.14 9
R. § 4545(a) (Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-19-34.1(a) (Supp.1986); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-14-4.5 (Supp. 1987).
,44 See supra note 143.
14' ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-565(c) (Supp. 1986) (Under this provision, if a
collateral source has a right of subrogation by statute, the jury cannot reduce a
plaintiff's award by the amount received from that source. Otherwise, the collat-
eral source is not subrogated to the rights of the plaintiff.); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.50 (West 1986) (The provider of collateral sources is entitled to subroga-
tion rights by law.); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 2-1205(4) (Smith-Hurd 1987) (The
court will not reduce the plaintiff's award by the amount of collateral benefits
received if there is a right of recoupment; the statute does not specify that this
right must only be provided by law.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3403(b) (1986); MASS.
ANN. LAws ch.231, § 60G(c) (Law Co-op 1987); NEv. REV. STAT. § 44-2819(1)
(1984) (The statute provides that the court will reduce the plaintiff's award only
by "nonrefundable" insurance proceeds.); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 4545(a) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1987) (As to worker's compensation or employee benefit programs,
the court will not deduct from the plaintiff's award if the sources are entitled to a
lien against the plaintiff's recovery by law.); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 21-3-12
(Supp. 1987) (Those collateral sources received by the plaintiff that fall under the
provisions of the statute and are not subject to subrogation, are deductible from
the plaintiff's award.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-19-9.5 (Supp. 1987) (There is no
reduction for collateral sources for which a subrogation right exists.); WASH REV.
CODE ANN. § 770.080 (The plaintiff may introduce evidence of an obligation to
repay the collateral source for benefits received).
' 4; See supra note 145.
,47 ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.548 (1983); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 231, § 60G(c)
(Supp. 1987).
-' Id.
.... CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.1(b) (West Supp. 1987) ("No source of collateral
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The state legislatures also do not agree on who should
consider evidence that a collateral source reimbursed the
plaintiff for his injury. The states are almost evenly split
on whether the court or the jury will hear evidence that
the plaintiff received collateral benefits.' If the court
hears the evidence after the jury has rendered an award,
the legislature may have solved the problem of overcom-
pensation, but it did not solve the problem of jury specu-
lation as to whether or not the plaintiff was insured. The
jury still does not hear evidence of whether or not the
plaintiff had insurance to cover some of her damages.151
Arizona takes a unique approach by allowing the trier of
fact to give plaintiff's receipt of collateral benefits
whatever weight it chooses.1 2
The Illinois legislature designed a very different scheme
with regard to deducting collateral benefits from a plain-
tiff's recovery. Only half of the benefits received by the
plaintiff for lost wages or private or governmental disabil-
ity income programs is deductible from the judgment. 153
All of the benefits received for medical or caretaking ex-
penses are deductible. 54 The court only deducts from
the plaintiff's award in negligence actions; the court will
not make any deductions if the defendant committed an
benefits introduced ... shall cover any amount against the plaintiff nor shall it be
subrogated to the rights of the plaintiff against a defendant.); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-
19-34.1 (Supp. 1986) ("Whenever an award is so reduced, the lien of any first
party payor who has paid such a benefit, against the judgment shall be foreclosed
and the plaintiff shall have no legal obligations to reimburse said payer.")
I.- Alaska, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New York and Utah only
allow the defendant to introduce evidence of collateral sources to the court after
an award has been rendered. Arizona, California, Delaware, Kansas, Rhode Is-
land, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Washington allow the jury to hear such evi-
dence. Iowa is not explicit as to who will hear this evidence but it appears that the
plaintiff simply cannot ask for such damages. The statute states that the "damages
awarded will not include losses replaced by collateral sources." IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 147.136 (West Supp. 1986).
I.,, See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
, ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-565(B) (Supp. 1986). This feature of the Ari-
zona Statute, thus, does not guarantee that the plaintiff's award will actually be
reduced. Siverson v. United States, 710 F.2d 557, 559 (9th Cir. 1983). The jury
may choose to ignore the plaintiff's receipt of collateral benefits. Id.
153 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 2-1205(8) (Smith-Hurd 1987).
,rw Id. 2-1205 (ii).
intentional tort. 155 Furthermore, the court will only re-
duce the judgment if the defendant applies to reduce the
judgment within a specified period of time. 56
While a medical malpractice statute still exists on the
books in New Hampshire, the supreme court found the
entire statute unconstitutional. 157 In deciding upon the
constitutionality of certain provisions of the legislation,
the court held that the validity of the legislation under
constitutional equal protection guarantees, would be sub-
ject to "a more rigorous judicial scrutiny than allowed
under the rational basis test."'' 15  The test, therefore, ex-
amined whether the legislation was "reasonable, not arbi-
trary, and [rested] upon some ground of difference having
a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legisla-
tion." 15 9 Under this test, the court found a number of
provisions unconstitutional, including the provision refus-
ing recovery for compensation received from collateral
sources.' 60 The court held that the valid portions of the
legislation could not be severed from the invalid ones and
thus held the entire chapter void.' 6 1 As indicated above,
the legislature never repealed the legislation. 62 Similar
challenges to the constitutional validity of other medical
malpractice statutes in other states were unsuccessful. 63
155 Id.
'16 Id.
157 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507C:7 (1983); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925,424
A.2d 825 (1980). It is for this reason that the New Hampshire statute is excluded
from the above discussion of the current medical malpractice statutes.
Carson, 120 N.H. at 925, 424 A.2d at 830.
.. Id. at 831 (emphasis in original).
I6 ld. at 831-39.
Id. at 839.
' See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507C:7 (1983).
";6 E.g., Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 684-
86, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985); Pinillos v. Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. Corp., 403 So.
2d 365, 367 (Fla. 1981) (The Florida Supreme Court, in upholding the constitu-
tionality of the medical malpractice statute, applied a "Rational Basis Test" on the
ground that "no suspect class or fundamental right expressly or impliedly pro-
tected by the constitution is implicated by [Florida's medical malpractice stat-
ute]." Id. at 367. The court found, under the test, that there was a legitimate
state interest in protecting health care providers threatened by skyrocketing insur-
ance rates. Id. The court concluded that protecting the health care providers in
such a way also protected the public health by insuring the continued availability
1988] COMMENT 821
822 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [53
The validity of the Ohio medical damage award statute
is also questionable.1 64 In 1976, two Courts of Common
Pleas in Ohio struck down various provisions of the state's
medical malpractice legislation, including the partial abo-
lition of the collateral source rule. 165 In finding the partial
abrogation of the rule invalid, the Graley court relied on
an equal protection analysis.' 66 The court held that the
statute unconstitutionally conferred benefits on medical
malpractice defendants that were unavailable to defend-
ants in other tort actions. 67 The court found no satisfac-
tory reason for such different treatment. 68 The authority
of the Graley and Simon opinions is questionable since the
factual situations the courts considered occurred before
passage of the legislation. 169 In deciding whether to void
legislation similar to Ohio's, a United States District
Court refused to recognize the authority of either the
Graley or Simon opinions. 70 The court held that the find-
ings in both opinions regarding the constitutionality of
the state's medical malpractice statutes were dicta and,
of medical services. Id. at 367-68.). The Illinois Supreme Court recently ad-
dressed this issue in Bernier v. Burris, 113 Ill. 2d 219, 497 N.E.2d 763 (1986).
The court in Bernier found no violation of equal protection because the statute
bore a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest of reducing the
costs of malpractice actions by eliminating double recoveries. Id.; Lambert v. Sis-
ters of Mercy Health Corp., 369 N.W.2d 417, 424 (Iowa 1985); Baker v. Vander-
bilt Univ., 616 F. Supp. 330, 333 (M.D. Tenn. 1985). For a discussion of the
debate among the states over the constitutionality of the medical malpractice re-
form statutes, see Note, Ohio's Attempts to Halt the Medical Malpractice Crisis. Effective
or Meaningless?, 9 U. DAYTON L. REV. 361 (1984).
"' See OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.27 (Anderson 1981) which relates to dam-
age award reductions. For a further discussion of this statute, see Comment, Limi-
tation on Recovery of Damages in Medical Malpractice Cases: A Violation of Equal
Protection?, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1329 (1986).
165 Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903,
909 (1976); Graley v. Sataytham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 832, 343 N.E.2d 832, 839
(1976). Graley held the damages provision of the Act, § 2305.27, unconstitutional.
Graley, 74 Ohio Op. 2d at 832, 343 N.E.2d at 839.
";lo Graley, 74 Ohio Op. 2d at 832, 343 N.E.2d at 836.
167 Id.
Id. at 837.
Simon, 3 Ohio Op. 3d at 164, 355 N.E.2d at 909; Graley, 74 Ohio Op. 2d at
832, 343 N.E.2d at 838.
170 Seoane v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 472 F.Supp. 368, 471-72 n.2 (1979).
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therefore, not authoritative.1 7'
C. No-Fault Actions
States have found other means by which to accomplish
the abolition of the collateral source rule. A number of
legislatures prohibit double recoveries under their "no-
fault" automobile accident statutes. Like the medical mal-
practice statutes, the purpose of limiting the application
of the collateral source rule under no-fault statutes is to
prevent duplicate recoveries and reduce insurance premi-
ums. 172 Each of the states enacting such legislation appar-
ently believes that the crisis faced by insurance companies
outweighs the desire to adequately compensate plaintiffs.
States with no-fault statutes deal with the collateral
source rule in various ways. Under the Georgia no-fault
statute, a plaintiff does not recover any economic losses
from a tortfeasor that are recoverable under the
mandatory minimum no-fault coverage or the optional
no-fault benefits.17 3  In any negligence action arising in
Minnesota as a result of the operation of a motor vehicle,
the claimant's recovery is reduced by the amounts "paid
or payable."'' 74 In North Dakota, the concern for prevent-
171 Id. at 472.
172 The Minnesota legislature has described the purpose of enacting the no-
fault statute as follows:
To correct imbalances and abuses in the operation of the automo-
bile accident tort liability system, to provide offsets to avoid dupli-
cate recovery, to require medical examination and disclosure, and to
govern the effect of advance payments prior to final settlement of
liability.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.51 (West 1986). The Michigan Supreme Court described
the purpose of that state's no-fault act as one to eliminate duplicate benefits,
thereby reducing the amount paid out by insurance companies and as such, the
amount they charge to the public obtain the insurance. Tebo v. Havlik, 418 Mich.
350, 343 N.W.2d 181, 187 (1984); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 500.3109,
500.3116, 550.3135 (West 1983). The trade-off for plaintiffs who loose the bene-
fit of the collateral source rule is lower insurance premiums. Tebo, 418 Mich. at
350, 343 N.W.2d at 187. The court found a careful legislative intent to limit du-
plicate recovery where such a limitation would benefit the no-fault insurer and,
thus, lower insurance rates. Id.
1," GA. CODE ANN. § 56-3410b (Harrison Supp. 1986); McGlohon v. Ogden,
251 Ga. 625, 308 S.E.2d 541, 542-43 (1983).
174 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.51 (subd.1) (West 1986).
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ing duplicate payments centers on the plaintiff's own vari-
ous insurance policies rather than on duplicate payments
by a tortfeasor. 75 The statute allows the no-fault insurer
to require "coordination of benefits" among the plain-
tiff's insurers so that the plaintiff receives compensation
only once. 1 76 This prevents the plaintiff from receiving
reimbursement for medical expenses, for example, from
his no-fault insurer and his health insurer. 77 A non-ex-
clusive list of other states which enacted no-fault statutes
include: Delaware,178  Florida,179  Michigan,180  New
Jersey, '8 ' Pennsylvania,' 2 and Utah.183
D. Other Limitations on the Collateral Source Rule
State legislatures in other states elected to eliminate the
collateral source rule in other particular areas. In a prod-
uct liability action, Alabama allows the jury to receive evi-
dence that a collateral source paid the plaintiff's medical
or hospital expenses.'84 The plaintiff is entitled to reim-
bursement for the costs of obtaining the insurance. 85 Illi-
nois and Ohio also reject the concept of double recovery
for plaintiffs bringing product liability actions. 186 In New
York, in actions against a public employer by a public em-
ployee injured while acting within the scope of her em-
ployment, the court will consider evidence that a public
employer paid for benefits or provided benefits for eco-
, N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-41-13 (1985).
176 Id.
177 Kiefer v. General Casualty Co., 381 N.W.2d 205, 207 (N.D. 1986) (interpret-
ing the predecessor of the present no-fault act, N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-41-10
(1978); the language of the past and present statutes are identical.).
17- DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2118(g) (1985).
17s, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.7372 (West 1984).
IN.. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 500.3109, 500.3116, 500.3135 (West 1983).
1' NJ. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-6 (West Supp. 1987).
'18 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1711-1798 (Purdon 1987). Under section 1754,
a claimant's recovery in a tort action will be set off by any amounts received under
the statute. Id.
' UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-309 (1986).
84 ALA. CODE § 6-5-522 (1986).
185 Id.
1.. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 2-1205.1 (1987); Amended Substitute H.B. 1,
117th Gen Assembley, 1987, Ohio.
nomic losses claimed by the plaintiff.'8 7 The court, under
the statute, must reduce the plaintiff's award by the
amount received, less any amount contributed to receive
the benefit.'88  When a plaintiff brings a suit against a lo-
cal government in Pennsylvania, the plaintiff cannot re-
cover damages if insurance will cover the damages. 1'9 The
court deducts any insurance payments from the plaintiff's
award.190 Finally, in New Jersey, the collateral source rule
does not apply in actions against a public entity.' Like
other legislatures, New Jersey's legislature found that
public policy considerations dictated that plaintiffs should
not benefit from duplicate recoveries. 1 2 Unlike statutes
in other states, this statute does not specify how the rule
will operate. The provision merely states that benefits
from "sources" available to the plaintiff "shall be dis-
closed to the court."' 9 3 The statute dictates that such
sources/are deducted from the claimant's award, but does
not disclose whether the court or the trier of fact will con-
sider this evidence. 19 4
Some states, while generally allowing the application of
the collateral source rule, allow the defendant to intro-
duce evidence of collateral sources for reasons other than
to prove the plaintiff has not suffered a loss. The most
common reason in favor of admitting the plaintiff's re-
ceipt of collateral benefits is to prove malingering. 95 A
'18 N.Y. Civ. PRic. L. & R. § 4545(b) (McKinney 1987). This provision does
not apply to collateral sources which are entitled by law to liens against the plain-
tiff's recovery. Id.
''Id.
75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8553(d) (Purdon 1982). Under this statue collat-
eral sources do not include life insurance benefits. Id.
Id.
N.J. STAT. ANN. 59:9-2(e) (West 1982).
1102 Id.
, Id.
' Id. The statute excludes life insurance benefits and sources with a right of
subrogation. Id.
1..5 See, e.g., Corsetti v. Stone Co., 483 N.E.2d 793, 802 (Mass. 1985). In a "ma-
lingering" case the defendant is trying to prove, for example, that the plaintiff is
not working only because she receives more money from being disabled than by
working. See id.
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court may also permit evidence of the availability of collat-
eral benefits to go to the jury if the evidence helps prove
an issue in the case.1
9 6
Courts in at least four states allow a defendant to intro-
duce evidence of collateral sources to show that the plain-
tiff is malingering. 19 7 When the issue is the severity of the
plaintiff's injury, the District of Columbia allows the de-
fendant to introduce evidence of collateral sources to
show that this injury sued for was an aggravation of an
earlier injury, or to show that this injury was unconnected
to the accident over which the plaintiff has sued.19 8 Indi-
ana courts have admitted evidence of collateral sources if
they go to the establishment of a cause of action against
the defendant and the liability of the defendant.199 An In-
diana court allowed a defendant to introduce evidence of
the plaintiff's receipt of collateral benefits to discredit the
196 Selgado v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 86 N.M. 633, 526 P.2d 430, 435
(1974).
1,7McMiddleton, 139 Mich. App. at 418, 362 N.W.2d at 817-18 (In the proper
case, evidence that the plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits is admis-
sible to show that the plaintiff has little incentive to return to work. The defendant
must, however, establish an "extensive" foundation of malingering before he can
introduce this evidence. As the court held, "the proposed evidence must refute
the fact that plaintiff actually lost the wages or salary claimed."); Corsetti, 396
Mass. at 1, 483 N.E.2d at 802 (".... evidence of collateral source income [in same
circumstances] may be admissible, in the discretion of the trial judge" as proba-
tive of the credibility of a witness. Such evidence may be relevant, not as a reduc-
tion in the plaintiff's damages, but to show a motive for staying out of work. Id.
In this case, the court also admitted the evidence to show that the plaintiff was
receiving a higher income disabled than before this accident. Id. at 802-03. The
evidence directly contradicted the plaintiff's testimony that he had less money
after the accident than before the accident. Id. at 803); Ridilla v. Kerns, 155 A.2d
517, 519 (D.C. 1959); Soucy v. Martin, 121 R.I. 651, 402 A.2d 1167, 1170 (1979)
("The collateral source rule... does not operate as a complete bar to the admis-
sion of the evidence in every situation." The court may admit evidence that the
employer paid the plaintiff during the period of his alleged disability as bearing on
the weight of plaintiff's testimony that the injury caused him to miss work. Id. at
1170-71.).
nis Ridilla, 155 A.2d at 519.
,,l Jackson v. Beard, 146 Ind. App. 382, 255 N.E.2d 837, 847 (1970). After this
case, Indiana, as discussed above" abrogated the collateral source rule for certain
collateral sources. See supra text accompanying notes 109-112. This decision,
however, should still apply to those sources covered under the collateral source
rule.
plaintiff's testimony as to lost income. 20 0 A New Mexico
court allowed the admission of collateral sources because
the evidence went to the issue of proximate cause.2 0 '
Still the general rule is that the admission of evidence
of collateral sources under any circumstances is too preju-
dicial to the plaintiff, and the likelihood of misuse by the
jury outweighs any value the evidence may have.20 2 The
states which allow a jury to hear evidence of collateral
sources apparently do not have the same concerns over
the jury's inability to utilize this evidence. Again, if one
premise of the collateral source rule is that juries are not
able to understand the consequence of collateral
sources, 203 then this premise begins to erode when some
states fail to abide by it in certain circumstances.
III. TORT REFORM AND THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
In 1986, the United States government and the City of
New York published two comprehensive government
studies on the insurance availability crisis. The United
States Attorney General commissioned one report (the
"Attorney General's Report") 204 and New York Governor
Mario Cuomo commissioned the other (the "Governor's
Report"). 0 5 Not surprisingly, the Attorney General's Re-
port found a tremendous increase in the number of tort
lawsuits and in the level of damage awards. 20 6 Recogniz-
ing that most claims settled before trial, the Attorney
General's Report emphasized that the size of verdicts
211°Jackson v. Beard, 255 N.E.2d at 847. The plaintiff, in effect, waived the col-
lateral source rule by testifying that he had received less income after the accident
than before. Id. In doing so, the plaintiff opened up the issue of reduced income
and permitted the defendant to cross-examine him on this issue. Id.
201 Selgado, 86 N.M. at 633, 526 P.2d at 434.
202 See, e.g., Eichel, 375 U.S. at 255; see supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
204 See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
2-", Attorney General's Report, supra note 34.
205 Governor's Report, supra note 34.
201 Attorney General's Report, supra note 34, at 45. For example, the average
medical malpractice jury verdict in 1975 was $220,018 while the average in 1985
was $1,017,717. Id. at 35.
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awarded affects the dollar amount of settlement offers.2 °7
The Report also found uncertainty as to what standard of
liability and causation applied in tort actions because of
the rapidly and dramatically changing rules of tort liabil-
ity.208 The Report concluded that the major cause of in-
surance unavailability and high costs was "tort law."120 9
Both the Attorney General's Report and the Governor's
Report suggest changes in the collateral source rule as
part of an overall effort of tort reform. 21 0 The Attorney
General's committee recommended reducing plaintiffs'
awards by the amount of benefits received from collateral
sources as compensation for the plaintiff's injury. 21' Fur-
ther, in order to simplify the application of their sugges-
tion, the committee recommended that state legislatures
eliminate subrogation rights of collateral sources. 2
They also suggested that publicly provided sources not be
considered when assessing the plaintiff's damages.213 Ac-
cording to the Attorney General's Report, allowing the
plaintiff to recover from public sources forces other citi-
zens to pay twice for plaintiff's injures.2 4 Citizens pay
first as taxpayers funding the public source and second as
consumers paying increased prices for products involved
in the litigation.1 l
The Governor's Report also recommended the abroga-
tion of the collateral source rule in all tort actions. 2 16 The
Report found that the rule overcompensated plaintiffs,
2,,7 Id. at 49.
20 Id. at 51; see also Governor's Report, supra note 34 at 123.
2(0. Attorney General's Report, supra note 34, at 80. Both the Tort Policy Work-
ing Group and Governor Cuomo's committee also blamed insurance companies
for the financial crisis in which they find themselves. Id. at 16-30; Governor's
Report, supra note 34, at 8-12 and 70-79.
2 '1)Attorney General's Report, supra note 34 at 70-72; Governor's Report, supra
note 34, at 71.





2IiGovernor's Report, supra note 34, at 136.
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imposing unnecessary costs on society. 217 As the commit-
tee stated, abolishing the rule "serves both goals of fair-
ness and those of cost reduction. 218
The concern over the insurance availability crisis and
the consequent interest in reforming many tort liability
rules is evident by the number of current attempts by
states to reform tort law. In March of 1986, the New York
Times published an article on the current state of tort re-
form.21 9 In surveying the area of tort reform among the
states, the New York Times discovered that over 1,000
pieces of tort reform legislation were pending in state leg-
islatures. 220  Nearly every state legislature that met in
1986 had considered a bill to change the state's civil liabil-
ity system.221 The previously discussed legislative
changes in the collateral source rule reflect one part of the
reform effort. It is likely that the rule will be the subject
of consideration and change by legislatures still debating
tort reform.222
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE ON
CHOICE OF LAW DECISIONS AND ON MULTI-STATE
LITIGATION
The disparity in the application of the collateral source
217 Id.
2 8, Id.
219 Insurance Woes Spur Many States to Amend Law on Liability Suits, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 31, 1986, at 1, col. 2. The New York Law Journal has also published an
article on the current insurance crisis and its effect on tort reform. Mayesh &
Reid, Current State of Tort Reform Ignited by Insurance Crisis, 195 N.Y.L.J., May 20,
1986, at 1, col. 3-4.
22o N.Y. Times at 1. (quoting Constance Heckman, Executive Director of the
American Legislative Exchange Council).
221 Id.
222 For example, in its last legislative session the Texas legislature passed a
sweeping tort reform measure. 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2, §§ 1.01 - 4.05
(Vernon). The House/Senate joint committee on Liability Insurance and Tort
Law and Procedure found that a serious liability insurance crisis existed in Texas.
Id. § 1.01 (a)(2). The Committee proposed the tort reform legislation because of
the adverse effects the crisis was having on the availability and affordability of
liability insurance "and the economic development and growth of this state and
the well-being of its citizens." Id. The comprehensive legislation, however made
no change in the collateral source rule with regard to any type of tort action.
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rule across the states not only fosters inequitable applica-
tion of the rule, but creates uncertainty in the choice-of-
law area. A court can be faced with deciding whose law to
apply when a tort has occurred outside the forum state or
when a number of suits are pending in jurisdictions all
over the country. In choice-of-law situations, the question
becomes whether the fact that one state would apply the
rule while another state would not, should affect the
court's determination of which law to apply. When multi-
state litigation arises over a defendant's conduct, there is
a question as to whether it is equitable to prohibit certain
plaintiffs from one state from receiving a double recovery
while other plaintiffs injured from the same tortious con-
duct are denied such a recovery.
At least one court focused on the collateral source rule
and its availability or non-availability as a basis for decid-
ing which state's law to apply in a choice-of-law conflict. 22 1
In American Standard Insurance Co. v. Cleveland, the Wiscon-
sin Court of Appeals addressed a situation in which two
Wisconsin residents were involved in an automobile acci-
dent in Minnesota. 2 4 Wisconsin applies the collateral
source rule in all tort actions 22 5 while Minnesota, under its
no-fault statute, abolished the collateral source rule in au-
tomobile collision cases.226 Applying Wisconsin's choice
of law rules, 227 the court found that Wisconsin's collateral
2- American Standard Ins. Co. v. Cleveland, 124 Wis. 2d 258, 369 N.W.2d 168
(Ct. App. 1985).
224 Id. at 170. The plaintiff and defendant were traveling in separate
automobiles when they were involved in the accident in Minnesota. Id. Both par-
ties were insured by Wisconsin companies. Id.
22 Id. at 170-71.
22,1 Id. at 170; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.51(1) (West 1986).
227 Wisconsin has two tests it follows in its choice of law analysis. American Stan-
dard Ins. Co., 124 Wis. 2d at 258, 369 N.W.2d at 171. The first test requires a
determination as to "whether the contacts of one state to the facts of the case are
so obviously limited and minimal that application of that state's law constitutes
officious intermeddling." Id. If no "officious intermeddling" is involved, the
court then applies a "choice - influencing consideration" test. Id. The factors
for the court to consider are: (1) predictability of results; (2) maintenance of inter-
state order; (3) simplification of the judicial task; (4) advancement of the forum
state's interest; and (5) application of the better rule of law. Id. at 171-72.
source rule would govern.228 The court held, under Wis-
consin's choice-of-law rule, that applying Minnesota's no-
fault law would constitute "officious intermeddling".2 29
According to the court, applying the collateral source rule
advanced Wisconsin's governmental interests by provid-
ing full compensation to persons injured by negligent
conduct and by deterring such conduct. 2 30 The court con-
cluded that Wisconsin insurers and parties expected the
collateral source rule to apply.23' The court went further
and held that the collateral source rule simply was, in its
own opinion, a better rule than Minnesota's no-fault
law.23 2 The court focused entirely on the collateral source
rule in deciding its choice-of-law question.2 3 The court
ignored the first and second factor of its own "choice-in-
fluencing consideration" test: predictability of results and
maintenance of interstate order.234 It also treated the site
of the accident as an inconsequential consideration.235
This case illustrates that the collateral source rule could
potentially become the central focus in a choice-of-law
analysis when two interested states have opposing views
on the collateral source rule. The importance of other
policy reasons for applying one state's law to a lawsuit is
diminished and the importance of the collateral source
rule as a factor in deciding which state law to apply is in-
creased. The consequences of such a practice are numer-
ous and are, most importantly, unpredictable.
A look at another choice-of-law test illustrates how the
228 Id. at 172.
229 Id. In so holding, the court found that Minnesota's primary interest in the
suit was in regulating highway safety within its borders while Wisconsin's interest
was in regulating the economic and social consequences of the tortious conduct.
Id. The court placed emphasis on the fact that Minnesota's law was not intended
to deter negligent conduct while Wisconsin's law was so intended. Id.
230 Id.
2.' Id. The court therefore seems to be saying that Wisconsin law would follow
anybody hurt in another state by virtue of their Wisconsin residency and the fact
that they are insured by a Wisconsin corporation.
212 Id. at 172-73.
233 Id. at 171-73.
2:11 See supra note 227.
235 See American Standard Ins. Co., 124 Wis. 2d at 258, 369 N.W. 2d at 172.
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collateral source rule could influence a court's choice-of-
law decision. That test is the "most significant relation-
ship test. '236 One important factor of the test requires a
court to consider the relevant policies of the interested
states.2" If the court holds that the application of the col-
lateral source rule is a significant policy of a state, there is
a potential for that rule becoming the focus of the choice-
of-law inquiry. The concern should be whether such a sit-
uation is desireable in light of the inconsistent results that
are likely to occur.
A court, in applying the most significant relationship
test, could simply find application of the collateral source
2.- The "most significant relationship" test, is a combination of the following
two sections under the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts:
§ 6. Choice-of-Law Principles
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statu-
tory directive of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the
choice of the applicable rule of law include:
(a) the need of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(0 certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied.
§ 145. The General Principle
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in
tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect
to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence
and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of
§ 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative impor-
tance with respect to the particular issue.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 6, 145 (1969). For an example
of an application of this rule, see Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex.
1979).
2.7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 6(2) (1969).
rule under the particular facts is a significant, relevant
policy. A court, thus, could defeat the policy of its own
state by applying another state's collateral source rule. A
choice-of-law situation coupled with multistate litigation
(in which a number of cases arising out to the same tor-
tious conduct are pending in more than one jurisdiction)
would only serve to exacerbate the problem. The poten-
tial for inconsistent application of the collateral source
rule is serious because the application of the collateral
source rule can significantly affect the amount of a plain-
tiff's recoveries. Even where a court decides that one
state's law applies to all actions brought in connection
with a tort giving rise to the multi-state litigation, it must
then determine if the collateral source rule will affect the
decision as to which state's law will apply. Questions
should be raised as to whether the collateral source rule
will be inequitably applied among the various jurisdic-
tions. Further, where a number of suits arising out of one
tortious incident of tortious conduct are brought in vari-
ous jurisdictions that apply the collateral source rule dif-
ferently, some plaintiffs will potentially receive a double
recovery while similarly situated plaintiffs will not. The
outcome can have a significant impact directly on plain-
tiffs and defendants, and indirectly on society.
V. CONCLUSION
The result of complete or partial abrogation of the col-
lateral source rule in less than every jurisdiction serves to
undermine the very premise of maintaining the collateral
source rule. If only certain types of injuries and only cer-
tain plaintiffs benefit from the double recovery aspect of
the rule, then courts and legislatures should question the
validity of the rule in its present state. While some argu-
ment may exist for applying the collateral source rule to
sources funded either actually or constructively by the
plaintiff, such arguments lose their force when the collat-
eral source is one to which the plaintiff never contributed
nor bargained for or when the source consists of wholly
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gratuitous services. The disparate application of the rule
is particularly troublesome when the rule applies only to a
few plaintiffs in related tort actions. The nationwide con-
cern for skyrocketing insurance premiums and jury
awards has prompted a much needed closer look at the
need for and justification of the collateral source rule. As
each state debates the future of the rule in tort actions,
the legislatures and courts should give some thought,
first, toward bringing about uniformity in the application
of the rule either in their own state or with other states.
At present, governments, businesses, individuals and in-
surance companies face only uncertainty as to the extent
of their future liabilities. As such, the states cannot view
the collateral source rule in the isolated world of one par-
ticular lawsuit.
The problem of disparate treatment of the collateral
source rule across the United States becomes further ap-
parent when one considers the nature of our highly mo-
bile society and our complex system of interstate
commerce. Our society today relies on a commercial sys-
tem far removed from the one that existed when the col-
lateral source rule first appeared. How one state applies
the rule does not affect its citizens in isolation. Citizens of
one state travel and are injured in other states. Defective
products are manufactured in one state and cause injuries
in other states. When an airplane accident occurs in one
state, the resulting litigation involves a multitude of state
and federal courts, each applying various forms of the col-
lateral source rule. Inconsistency in the availability of the
rule has a significant monetary impact on plaintiffs and
defendants and creates an air of uncertainty for individu-
als, businesses and insurance companies as to future
liabilities.
The disparate application of the collateral source rule
exemplifies the need for each state to carefully review its
treatment of the rule. Particularly, the state courts and
legislatures must determine whether their application of
the rule is affecting similarly situated plaintiffs differently.
1988] COMMENT 835
This determination should consider not only the intra-
state impact of a change or continuation of the rule, but
should consider the interstate impact as well. Another
important consideration centers on the potential for
abuse under choice-of-law rules. Will one court disregard
other important elements in a choice of law analysis and
focus solely on the availability of the collateral source
rule? The states should reexamine the policies support-
ing the creation of the rule and ask if such policies can still
justify the continued use of the rule. While it would be
unrealistic to expect a uniform application of the collat-
eral source rule across the country, it is realistic to expect
the citizens of each state to reevaluate the rule as they de-
bate tort reform in their state.
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